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 1 
Introduction 
Japan has long been criticised for its trivial contribution to refugee acceptance. 
Therefore, the international community celebrated the announcement, in December 
2008, that it would instigate a pilot phase of the Refugee Resettlement Programme 
(RRP). This paper contributes to the discussion about the socio-political significance of 
Japan’s pilot RRP. It asks three related questions: why Japan adopted a RRP, why, 
despite its already humble objectives, has this program systematically failed to meet its 
targets, and whether this program indicates a significant shift in Japan’s history of 
restrictive policies towards refugees and immigration more broadly. Insights from the 
field of critical race theory are particularly useful to shed light on the larger context of 
race in Japan; a context which we argue to be a key determinant for understanding the 
country’s refugee policy. Only in such light can we tackle the overarching question of 
whether Japan’s new refugee program signals an opening of the country to refugees and 
immigrants, a pressing question in light of Japan’s declining population. 
The paper builds on desk studies of the main literature and primary materials 
relating to Japan’s contemporary and historical refugee policy. In order to complement 
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and at times clarify the limited information available on the socio-political context that 
led Japan to adopt the Pilot RRP specifically, the paper further builds on a key set of 
targeted interviews with relevant stakeholders.1 
The paper is organised in five parts. The first section reviews literature on Japan’s 
refugee policies and makes the case for critical race theory as a useful tool for an 
analysis of the RRP. The second part provides an overview of Japan’s limited history of 
refugee acceptance. The third section examines how the pilot RRP was set up with 
highly restrictive selection criteria. The remainder of the paper analyses why the 
program was adopted and swiftly sabotaged. The last section of the paper reflects on 
this program in light of Japan’s history of racism and demonstrates that despite the 
appearance of change, race issues continue to be solidly rooted in Japan’s immigration 
policies. 
 
The politics of embedded racism 
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The literature on Japan’s stance towards refugees is limited. It is primarily confined to 
significant historical periods, such as the post-WW II period and the Indo-Chinese 
refugee intake in the late 1970s, or to Japan’s immigration regime from a legal 
perspective.2 Nonetheless, a small cluster of contemporary studies examines the 
socio-political context of Japan’s exceptionally restrictive policy towards refugees.3 
These chiefly focus on how national and international stakeholders – the international 
community to local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Japan’s Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) – have attempted to influence the country’s refugee policies. Some 
scholars emphasise how the MOJ has been unresponsive to outside influence, holding 
on to its monopoly on decisions over refugee protection.4 In such light, Japan’s 
decision in 2008 to begin a pilot phase of the RRP is puzzling. 
In addition to policy reports from stakeholders, a key set of scholars academic 
studies have begun to analyse the pilot RRP.5 These studies have mainly focused on the 
thorny issue of refugee integration policies.6 For instance, Yamashita has studied 
integration from the perspectives of resettled refugees7 while more recently, Lee has 
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mapped how the state’s failure to involve other actors has exposed refugees to difficult 
conditions.8  
While these studies provide insights on the implementation process of this program, 
little is known about the broader socio-political context that explain why Japan has 
adopted the RRP or the significance of this program in light of the country’s history of 
exclusionary policies. To address these questions, we draw on insights from critical race 
theory (CRT). CRT has most commonly been used to analyse cases in the United States, 
where a branch of CRT, white critical studies, examines whether ‘white privilege exists, 
and what its components are’.9 Although CRT has seldom been applied to case studies 
in which the privileged majority is non-white, a few scholars have begun to make the 
case for expanding CRT to societies without a white majority.10 In the context of Japan, 
CRT is better framed within the myth of ethnic homogeneity, rather than race.11 
Arudou warns that while Whiteness Studies may resonate with other societies, in the 
case of Japan, it is important not to bluntly substitute ‘white’ with ‘Japanese’ as the 
term: 
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[…] both entails ‘a Japanese citizen’ (a legal status which can include 
people of different races and ethnic backgrounds), and ‘a Japanese by 
blood’ (a racialized paradigm that can include, […] people who do not 
have Japanese citizenship, such as Nikkei imported workers from South 
America).12 
The term also ignores other constituents such as the country’s indigenous people of 
Hokkaido and Okinawa, or Japanese children born out of international relationships.13 
Likewise, racism in Japan also extends to ethnic minority groups who have Japanese 
nationality – notably, the long-term resident Zainichi Koreans.14 In short, the myth of 
ethnic homogeneity – the idea of ‘Japanese-ness’ – has spurred discrimination against 
refugees and foreign migrants regardless of their background. 
While some scholars have examined multiculturalism and discrimination in Japan, 
little has been written specifically from a CRT perspective.15 Yet CRT challenges 
mainstream beliefs around race and racism in Japan and provides new insights on recent 
changes to refugee policy. Notably, CRT posits that historical and contextualised policy 
analyses can show how, despite the emergence of new discourses and policies, past 
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racial domination continues to be solidly rooted in legal frameworks.16 Arudou, one of 
the rare authors to have applied CRT to Japan, sheds light on the normalisation of 
‘embedded racialised paradigms’ behind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ visa allocation 
scheme, a process that he argues has long influenced the country’s immigration 
system.17 In this vein, and building on Arudou’s insights, we argue that the failure of 
Japan’s pilot RRP to achieve its targeted intake numbers is deeply informed by the 
country’s embedded racialised paradigms.  
 
Japan’s history of refugee assistance 
 
Japan’s history of refugee acceptance is abysmal. In the late 1970s, a trickle of 
refugees was finally admitted when the Cold War came knocking on the country’s door. 
The Indochina crisis triggered a wave of over three million refugees and Western states, 
especially the United States, urged the international community to take in refugees 
fleeing communist states18. Hence, Japan’s decision to accept 500 Indochinese refugees 
in 1978 was externally driven, as the country was under tremendous pressure to tackle 
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its lack of commitment to international refugee intake.19 Amidst the crisis, Japan began 
to adopt ad hoc measures to accept Indochinese refugees – both as a first asylum 
country and as a resettlement state, Japan hosted a total of 11,071 refugees.20 In 1981, 
three years after the initial intake of Indochinese refugees, Japan acceded to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol.21 However, in the 
following years, Japan would accept only a hand full of refugees. Between 1978 and 
2005, the country accepted only 376 additional refugees.22 Of the 22,559 asylum 
applications received between 1982 and 2014, less than three per cent (633) have been 
granted refugee status.23  
 
While the number of asylum seekers to Japan reached a record high in 2014 – almost a 
20-fold increase in the last decade24 – only 0.2 per cent of all applications that year 
were granted25 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
[Figure 1. Asylum Applications (2010-2017) around here] 
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By comparison, in 2014 the United States accepted 273,202 refugees, Germany 
316,115, and the Netherlands 88,536.26 In Germany, one person out of 255 is a refugee, 
in the United States, one out of 1,178, while in Japan, it is only one out of 51,161.27  
In contrast to its low intake of refugees, Japan has remained one of the most 
generous donors to the UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations.28 For Takizawa, 
a former UNHCR representative in Japan, such ‘checkbook diplomacy’ has long 
conveyed an implicit message to the international community: ‘we will give you money, 
please take care of refugees outside of Japan’.29 By the end of the 1990s, the UNHCR, 
human rights organisations, international media outlets, and legal experts had become 
increasingly critical of Japan’s reluctance accept refugees.30 The Economist observes 
that the country has a ‘stingy record on sheltering people fleeing conflicts of all kinds’31 
while Takahashi, a human rights lawyer, concludes that ‘Japan’s record at providing 
protection to refugees is dismal’32. 
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 Japan’s announcement in 2007 that it would establish a pilot phase of the RRP33 
and pledged to annually resettle thirty refugees was therefore astonishing.34 Hailed as a 
turning point in Japan’s exclusionary refugee policy, the move was even more 
significant given that Japan would be the very first Asian nation to join the RRP. For 
Cels, a UNHCR officer, the Pilot phase of the RRP was to be celebrated as ‘a new 
chapter in Japan’s strengthening of its refugee and asylum policies’, further adding that 
‘not only does the country provide generous financial support for refugees in many parts 
of the world, but now also provides a future for refugees in the country’.35 For 
Takizawa, the Programme finally moved the country away from the usual international 
‘Japan bashing’,36 and argued that the discourse around refugees in Japan was 
significantly improving.37 
However, an examination of the negotiation process that led to the approval of the 
Pilot RRP and the narrow selection criteria embedded in the program indicates that the 
overarching optimism around the significance of Japan’s decision was overstated.  
 
An analysis of the pilot RRP 
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Despite the program’s humble objectives in comparison to the refugee resettlement 
rates of other high-income countries, by the end of the five-year trial phase in 2015, 
Japan had only accepted a total of eighty-six refugees. While it may be argued that in 
light of the country’s abysmal record, any refugee intake in Japan is an achievement in 
itself, it is relevant to note that from the start, the idea of the RRP was ‘sold’ by the 
UNHCR to MOJ officials38 on the grounds that it would only accept a small number of 
refugees,39 hence the humble target of annually resettling thirty refugees. Additionally, 
the Pilot Programme was framed around selection criteria that were to further restrict 
the number of applicants, a process that challenged the very objective of the RRP. 
The aim of any RRP is to offer refugee protection and a durable solution on the 
basis of need and as such, UNHCR is explicit in urging resettlement states ‘not to use 
integration potential and other discriminatory selection criteria (e.g. family size, age, 
health status, ethnicity and religion)’.40 The UNHCR further explains that: 
Such discriminatory criteria undermine the needs based approach to resettlement, 
creating inequalities and protection gaps, and limiting the access of refugees most 
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at risk. There is international evidence that even the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged refugees can successfully integrate over time with the right 
support. States are therefore encouraged to be responsive to UNHCR’s 
humanitarian selection criteria focusing on those most at need […].41  
However, in contrast to UNHCR guidelines, Japan’s pilot program had highly selective 
eligibility requirements. In fact, from the start, the humanitarian imperative was 
dismissed, both broadly – that is in the very definition of ‘persecution’ – and more 
specifically, in the criteria adopted for the Program.42 
The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as someone who has a well-founded fear 
of persecution in their country of residence. While ‘persecution’ is not defined in the 
Convention or in any other international instrument, states do not have the liberty of 
arbitrarily expanding or narrowing the scope of their obligations as they see fit.43 
Rather, Article 33 of the Convention infers that ‘a threat to life or physical freedom 
constitutes persecution, as would other serious violations of human rights’.44 Yet, the 
MOJ elected that ‘persecution’ only applied ‘to those who would be killed for sure or be 
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imprisoned if they returned home’.45 In short, for the MOJ, persecution refers only to 
‘threats to life and limb’.46  
Additionally, three exclusive selection criteria were adopted by MOJ officials. 
Applicants would need to be Karen speakers, members of a nuclear family with few 
children, and able to secure employment. According to the MOJ, it focused on Karen 
people because they constituted the majority in UNHCR refugee camps in Thailand. 
The exclusionary criteria did curb significantly the recruitment process for the Pilot 
Project. In fact, throughout the entire duration of the pilot phase, the Programme 
systematically failed to meet its annual targets (see Figure 2). Altogether, only 
eighty-six people (eighteen families) were accepted into the Programme, sixty-four 
people short of the expected total of 150.  
 
[Figure 2. Number of People Accepted for Resettlement (Pilot RRP) around here] 
  
According to a former UNHCR officer in Bangkok, by the time the pilot RRP had 
begun many Karen refugees in Thailand had already been resettled in other countries, 
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leaving but a handful of refugees who met Japan’s strict selection criterion.47 
Moreover, during the recruitment campaigns in Thai refugee camps, these strict 
selection criterion were purposely advertised.48 Although several families 
recommended by the UNHCR were rejected without any stated reasons, the MOJ did 
amend the selection criteria several times to increase its intake of refugees.49 For 
example, it expanded the eligibility of candidates beyond the refugee camp of Mae La 
to other camps in Thailand.50 Additionally, in 2013 the program was opened to 
Burmese speakers and the definition of ‘family’ was broadened to include parents and 
unmarried siblings. 
While some stakeholders were quick to argue that asylum seekers themselves 
self-selected out of settling in Japan, this explanation remains weak in a contemporary 
context in which the number of asylum seekers has significantly increased. In fact, this 
politics of deterrence and the ‘sabotage’ of the pilot RRP is better understood within the 
larger context of race in Japan.  
 
Embedded racism: ‘Japanese-ness’ and the pilot RRP 
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Some commentators have argued that Japan’s Pilot RRP significantly differs from past 
refugee policies in that for once, the decision was not externally driven and that 
therefore, it was not a cosmetic endeavour to serve the country’s foreign policy 
objectives.51 As stressed in the previous section of this paper, there is a consensus in 
the literature that the intake of Indochinese refugees more than thirty years earlier – the 
only significant entry of refugees in the country’s post-war history – was ‘imposed’ on 
Japan by the international community. Undoubtedly, in adopting a pilot phase of the 
RRP, Japan sought to boast its international standing and hence serve its foreign policy 
objectives: the Programme would strengthen the country’s international image and 
ultimately, trigger strong support from its allies, notably amidst Japan’s renewed bid for 
a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.52 However, in light of the 
dissuasive selection criterion built into the Programme, the argument remains 
unconvincing. In fact, and as discussed in this section of the paper, the intrinsic 
sabotage of the Project is better understood in light of an analysis that considers the 
long history of embedded racism at the heart of the MOJ’s Immigration Bureau. 
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It is illustrative to note that in the late 1990s, then Director of the Immigration 
Bureau argued that he wished no refugee would come to Japan.53 More recently, 
several studies on the monopoly of the MOJ over the refugee question, including recent 
evaluations of the implementation process of the Pilot RRP, show continuity in the 
Ministry’s inherent lack of responsiveness to external pressures not only from non-state 
actors such as civil society, but also to the broader international community and the 
UNHCR.54 Scholars such as Dean and Nagashima55 as well as Flowers56 have shown 
that the MOJ’s policies have long fed exclusionary practices and discourses, leaving 
little voice for any other stakeholders, whether local NGOs or the UNHCR. Similarly, 
Akashi demonstrates that the MOJ’s monopoly as the sole agency responsible for 
refugee protection goes a long way to explain why, despite being repetitively challenged 
over time, the country’s refugee policies have remained unchanged.57 In such light, 
Takizawa, the UNHCR Representative in Japan at the time of the negotiations around 
the Pilot RRP points out that from the start, it was clear that the idea of a Japanese RRP 
needed to be ‘sold’ to the MOJ.58 This was a tremendous task given that the General 
Director of the Immigration Bureau saw the idea to be unpopular both by politicians and 
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the general public.59 Crucially, the UNHCR had to market the project ‘from the point of 
view of the MOJ’.60 In short, the UNHCR has to address the MOJ’s core ‘obsession’ 
over refugee intake: security.61 
In Japan, refugees, and immigrants more broadly, have long been presumed to 
represent a threat to the country’s security, whether physically or to social cohesion. 
This embedded racism has been taking many forms, both discursively and in the realm 
of policies. In such light, it is unsurprising that issues of security and social cohesion 
drove the negotiation process leading to the adoption of the Pilot RRP. For instance, the 
MOJ needed assurance that it would be able to adequately ‘supervise’ the new intakes 
and therefore, it was decided that only thirty refugees would be resettled every year.62 
Likewise, the UNHCR had to reassure the MOJ that any prospective refugee relocated 
in Japan would have already underwent the UNHCR’s thorough background check and 
that it is within such pre-vetted pools of applicants that the government would then get 
to select ‘those refugees who Japan deems better fit for resettlement to Japan’.63 Here, 
somewhat arbitrarily given that there exists absolutely no evidence of this, the MOJ 
elected that Karen people with nuclear family would be most likely to adapt to Japanese 
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society.64 Broadly, this feeds into the long-cultivated myth of ‘Japanese-ness’ which 
stipulates that ‘integration into society is difficult, if not impossible, for 
non-Japanese’.65 
The idea of ‘Japanese-ness’ was long in the making. Following two centuries of 
voluntary seclusion (1639-1867) the newly opened Japan sought to ‘catch up’ with the 
nineteenth century and to rapidly modernise. Russel observes that by the end of the 
nineteenth century, in its attempt to meditate its own racial and cultural identity, Japan 
was significantly influenced by Western discourse on race.66 The country adopted the 
Social-Darwinism-led ‘cushy deliriums of Euro-American supremacy’, remoulding its 
identity notably in relation to its Asian neighbours.67 Furthermore, at the heart of the 
Meiji era and amidst its quest for modernity, a discourse of unity around the imperial 
system was purposely constructed, hence creating the myth of a ‘Japanese people’ 
distinct from the ‘outsider’: ‘even social deviance and other thoughts inimical to current 
State goals (such as individuality and socialism) were attributed to being ‘foreign’ (as 
in, significantly, ‘not Japanese’), thereby discounted or excluded’.68 The ‘racialisation 
process’69 was significant during the Meiji era which saw important exclusionary 
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policies embedded in Japan’s quest to settle its identity, as illustrated notably in the way 
that it attempted to construct nationality – the 1899 Nationality Law enshrined the 
‘blood-line’ as the only means to acquire Japanese nationality.70 
Following Japan’s surrender after the Second World War, amidst intense 
reconstruction efforts, the myth of ‘Japanese-ness’ continued to be promoted for 
political interests, notably in the State’s attempt to deal with the Korean immigrants 
remaining in the country, most of whom had been brought to Japan against their will 
during the War. While the majority of the two million Koreans that lived and worked in 
Japan during the War was compelled to return to their home country71 following 
Japan’s defeat, the remaining Korean immigrants,72 who still held Japanese nationality 
at the time, began to tactically be described by the government as a threat to national 
security and to the economy.73 Under the new Alien Registration Law (1947), this 
‘unmixing policy’74 which was now well under way, transformed Koreans, but also 
Taiwanese residents, into ‘aliens’ and henceforth legally required them to register with 
the government75 – this status would further be cemented with the adoption of the 
Nationality Act (1950) and the Immigration Control Act (1951).76 Crucially however, 
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these post-war legal and discursive boundaries were to solidly enshrine the myth of 
Japan’s mono-ethnic identity. Shin observes that: 
As the state formally codified the categorical boundaries between Japanese and 
Koreans, various public institutions followed the state’s categorisation and 
excluded Korean accordingly. Consequently, Koreans were barred from becoming 
lawyers, teachers, nurses, bank officers, and public servants such as postal 
workers. They are also excluded from bank loans, scholarships, health and social 
benefits. […] As a means of survival, many immigrants submitted themselves to 
cultural assimilation policy, to disguise their ethnic identity to avoid overt racism. 
The marginality of these colonial immigrants and their acculturation created an 
illusion of Japanese homogeneous nation and justified the exclusionary structure 
of Japanese society.77 
For Morris-Suzuki this restructuring of the boundaries of nationality amidst a ‘curious 
amnesia around – or a deliberate neglect of the country’s colonial legacy has lingered 
on to become the source ‘of continuing tensions beneath the apparently smooth surface 
of postwar Japanese nationhood’.78 Immigrants and refugees have since been viewed as 
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‘outsiders’ in Japan, as temporary rather than permanent residents.79 Deeply entrenched 
in this discourse is the idea that ‘others’ may altogether be disruptive to social harmony 
and cohesion80. The UNHCR reports that in Japan, ‘ethnic and cultural homogeneity has 
been sustained by strict controls on population movement and immigration’.81 
 
Old wine in a new bottle? 
 
Today, the persistence of ‘Japanese-ness’ around questions over refugee intake and 
immigration more broadly suggest that the Pilot RRP did not forecast a significant 
change in the country’s policy. 
It is illustrative to recall Manabe and Befu’s work to survey the persistence of 
nihonjinron in Japanese attitude back in the early 1990s.82 In line with the idea of 
‘Japanese-ness’, nihonjinron83 is a body of discourse seeking to depict Japan as racially 
pure and unique.84 Manabe and Befu divided their survey into four broad clusters: 1) 
Japanese as a homogeneous and unique people; 2) Japanese ‘blood’ as essential for 
mutual communication, mutual understanding, understanding of the culture and 
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appearance as Japanese; 3) ‘cultural competence’ or whether foreigners are capable of 
fully understanding Japanese culture or mastering the language and ; 4) ‘Social 
participation’, or whether the sociocultural territoriality of Japan should be defended 
and foreigners excluded in the areas of marriage, employment, teaching, and political 
and artistic leadership.85 The authors concluded that while nihonjinron remained ‘the 
world view and the ideology of the establishment’, the data emerging from the survey 
could be viewed as a weakening of nihonjinron, given that the younger generations 
appeared to have increasing doubts about the concept when travelling abroad and 
having foreign friends. However, the authors also concluded that it may also be possible 
to ‘forecast a more conservative Japan increasingly favourably oriented toward 
Nihonjinron’ given that: ‘the conservative values of the society are not just accidentally 
associated with the establishment, rather they are there because they buttress the 
existing economic and political institutions’.86 
More than a decade later, in the early 2000s, another study sought to assess whether 
the concept of nihonjniron was being challenged by a so-called emerging multicultural 
Japan.87 In the study, Brugess asked three questions: 1) does a popular ideology exist in 
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Japan that sees ethnic, cultural, and racial diversity together with migration as positive; 
2) what kind of ‘multicultural’ policies have been adopted in the country, particular in 
terms of treatment of non-citizens and ethnic groups and; 3) are there a large number of 
migrants present in (and transforming) Japanese society.88 Albeit carried out a decade 
later, Burgess’ conclusions echoed with Manabe and Befu’s more pessimistic forecast. 
Burgess concluded that by the turn of the century, Japan was not particularly 
multicultural in terms of either discourse, policy, or people. The author rather observed 
that there was a need to make a clear distinction between analyses that were wishfully 
predicting a multicultural Japan and the actual state of the country.89 
Today, further fed by electoral politics and media frenzy, public perception of 
refugees and immigrants as a threat to security and social cohesion is on the rise.90 It is 
worth noting that a 2006 Cabinet Office survey found that more than half of 
respondents were associating foreigners with a rise in crime despite the fact that in 
parallel to the country’s Lilliputian record of refugee intake, immigration in Japan has 
also remained abysmal. Between 1950 and 1990, the proportion of foreigners in the 
country has remained between 0.6 and 0.7 per cent, climbing to 0.9 per cent in 1995 and 
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reaching only 1 per cent in 2000.91 According to the country’s latest census (2015), 
while the proportion of foreigners in the country in now at its highest on record, it is 
only at 1.4 per cent.92 Nonetheless, issues of racial discrimination have remained 
rampant.93 While the Diet, Japan’s national legislature, passed the Hate Speech 
Elimination Bill in May 2016, a recent government survey shows that nearly 40 per cent 
of foreign residents seeking housing in Japan reported having been turned down 
because they were not Japanese,94 and one person in four reported discrimination while 
searching for employment.95 And amidst increasing tensions with Japan’s East Asian 
neighbours, this appears to be intensifying, including hostile sentiments against China.96 
Park bluntly observes that ‘racism is one of Japan’s gravest social problems’.97 
In fact, like Burges concluded more than a decade earlier, practical and logical 
projections that Japan will have to become more open to migration – Japan’s population 
is aging and shrinking – still remains ‘politically and popularly “unsayable” and 
unthinkable’.98 This directly speaks to Arudou’s own conclusions that the persistence 
of embedded racism in Japan will be increasingly problematic for the country:  
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Japan’s ‘blind spot’ towards accepting ‘outsiders’ will mean that its perpetual 
policy failure in countermanding ‘embedded racism’, by not acknowledging and 
effecting long-overdue legal protections for Japan’s non-citizens, will continue for 
the foreseeable future.99  
Likewise, it appears that predictions indicating that any forecast of significant 
changes to Japan’s immigration policies are highly improbable unless the issue of race 
and discrimination is brought to the forefront of public and institutional discussions. 
When pressed on the issue of Syrian refugees in 2015, Prime Minister Abe argued that 
the country would refrain from taking refugees in light of an internal ‘crisis’ now 
plaguing the country: ‘before accepting immigrants or refugees, we need to have more 
activities by women, elderly people and we must raise our birth rate. There are many 
things that we should do before accepting immigrants’.100 In direct continuity with past 
‘checkbook’ practices, Japan pledged US$1.6 billion in assistance for Syrians and Iraqis 
to meet what it refers to as its international responsibility to tackle the conditions that 
give rise to refugees in the first place.101 Takahashi bluntly observes: ‘The fact that 
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protecting refugees is an international legal obligation, not just one policy option states 
might want to consider when it suits them, never seems to have occurred to Abe’.102 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to contribute to the discussion over the socio-political 
significance of the instigation of Japan’s Pilot RRP. Three questions were raised: why 
has Japan adopted the Pilot RRP in the first place and why, despite its already humble 
objectives, has the Program systematically failed to meet its targets? It then asked the 
broader question of whether the Programme could be seen as a significant shift in 
Japan’s history of restrictive policies towards refugees – and immigration more broadly. 
We argued that insights from the field of CRT can shed new light on these 
questions, suggesting that the context of race remains a key determinant for 
understanding the country’s historical and contemporary refugee policies and discourse. 
The analysis has demonstrated that embedded racism was prevalent in decisions 
surrounding the Pilot RRP and as such, despite the appearance of change, racial 
domination continues to be solidly rooted in Japan’s policies and discourses. Therefore, 
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any serious strategy to revamp immigration and refugee policies in Japan would need to 
bring the country’s history of racism to the forefront of the discussion. 
While it does appear that Japan is now willing to discretely allow more skilled 
migrants in the country,103 recent figures on refugee intake show little change in past 
trends. In 2014, Japan’s RRP was made permanent. It resettled eighteen refugees in 
2015 and twenty-eight the following year. In 2017, Japan granted refugee status to 20 
out of a record-high 19,629 applicants.104 Here, like before, considerations relating to 
the human rights and social conditions of refugees were not prioritised. Once again, 
embedded racism percolates onto the issue. Suggestion that the majority of asylum 
seekers are ‘fake refugees’, migrant workers trying to abuse the nation’s asylum system 
abound.105 But this is not new for the country. It echoes with the late 1990s, when, in 
light of judicial challenges over the country’s high rejection rate of asylum applications 
at the time, the MOJ argued that the majority of asylum applicants were attempting to 
exploit and ‘abuse’ the system either because they were economic migrants or illegal 
entrants.106 
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Figure 1. Asylum Applications (2010-2017)
 
Source: Authors.107 
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Figure 2. Number of People Accepted for Resettlement – RRP Pilot Phase 
 
Source: Authors.108 
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